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Chapter 5: Side effects of school inspection; motivations and 
contexts for strategic responses 
Melanie Ehren, Karen Jones and Jane Perryman 
 
This chapter introduces three categories of unintended consequences from school 
inspections: 1) intended strategic behaviour where schools manipulate the inspection 
assessment through window dressing, misrepresentation or gaming, 2) unintended strategic 
behaviour when schools narrow their educational practices as a result of the behaviour of the 
assessor and/or by the method of working used for the assessment, and 3) other types of 
consequences, such as stress, anxiety and increased workload. As many inspection systems 
use standardized student achievement tests to evaluate school output, a fourth category on 
unintended responses to high stakes testing will also be introduced.  
The results from a recent systematic literature review will be used to provide evidence of 
responses in each of the four categories. The review shows that most studies present examples 
from England and previous case study work from Perryman (2006) will therefore offer more 
in-depth views of how an English school responds strategically to school inspections. The 
final section of the chapter provides explanations of the conditions under which such 
responses may occur.  
 
5.1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s it has been widely documented in literature that accountability systems, 
including school inspections, bring with them unintended consequences. These unintended 
consequences are often negative and have the potential to undo the intended positive effects. 
Despite the vast sums of public money spent on inspection throughout Europe and beyond, 
very little evidence exists as to how prevalent these potential side-effects are. This chapter 
will outline different types of unintended consequences, such as intended strategic behaviours 
where schools manipulate the inspection assessment through window dressing, 
misrepresentation or gaming, and unintended strategic behavior when schools narrow their 
educational practices as a result of the behavior of the school inspector and/or by the 
frameworks and working methods used to inspect schools (De Wolf and Janssens, 2007). 
Such frameworks and methods often include an examination of a school’s aggregated test 
results and league tables. Where this is the case strategic responses will likely also include 
examples of teaching to the test as found in test-based accountability systems.  
This chapter will draw on the previously described systematic literature review to provide an 
overview of the prevalence of the intended and unintended strategic behaviours and teaching 
to the test of schools in response to school inspections. Evidence from 49 studies from 
England (33 studies), the Netherlands (2 studies), Turkey (2 studies), Flanders (2 studies), 
Hong Kong (2 studies), Ireland (1 study), France (1 study), New Zealand (1 study), and 
Germany (1 study) will be used to give examples of the three types of responses across 
Europe, analysing differences in strategic responses of teachers compared to principals, and 
analysing the characteristics of inspection systems (e.g. perceived pressure and high stakes) 
that motivate such responses.  
 
5.2. Categories and types of unintended consequences of school inspection 
Many studies have reported how the implementation of rules and regulations, the monitoring 
of the implementation of such rules and regulations and performance in general may lead to 
behaviour which was not intended.  As Jones et al (in prep, p.4) explain, this was termed 
“unintended consequences” by Merton (1936) and his heavily cited article suggested that 
these unintended consequences can be positive or negative. The expansion and study of 
performance measurement schemes in the social sciences in the 1970s led to the discovery 
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and formulation of Cambell’s Law, which has become well cited in studies about unintended 
effects of educational accountability:  
 
The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort 
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor. 
Campbell (1976, 49) 
 
How performance measures can corrupt behaviour was explained in more detail in Smith’s 
(1995) seminal paper about the unintended consequences of standardized measures of 
performance. He explains how most performance indicator schemes will fail unless 
consideration is given to their deficiencies. In his paper he provides examples from a number 
of different sectors on how performance indicators can lead to tunnel vision, 
misrepresentation and a range of other behaviours. A number of authors have used his 
examples to explain similar strategies in schools responding to league tables and the 
publication of high stakes inspection assessments (e.g. Fitz-Gibbon, 1997). More recently, 
Smith’s overview of strategies have been used by De Wolf and Janssens (2007) to summarize 
the research into side effects of performance standards and school inspections, categorizing 
his strategies into three distinct categories of intended and unintended strategic behaviours 
and ‘other’ unintended consequences. These three categories guided our literature review and 
are used below to summarize our findings. 
 
5.2.1 Intended strategic behaviour 
The first category of unintended consequences is termed ‘intended strategic behaviour’ and 
refers to principals’ and teachers’ responses that are intentionally taken to improve the 
school’s inspection assessment. Responses include window dressing, fraud, gaming and 
misrepresentation.  
Window dressing occurs when schools implement procedures and protocols that have no 
effect on primary processes in the school, but are implemented to be assessed more positively. 
Schools are ‘brushed up’ to receive a more positive assessment. They can use several 
methods that vary in fairness and lawfulness to do so, such as fraud, gaming and 
misrepresentation. Fraud occurs when schools falsify numbers or records (such as test scores 
or lesson plans) used in school inspections to assess output or educational processes of/in 
schools. Misrepresentation occurs when schools manipulate behaviour they have to report on. 
Examples are excluding low performing students from exams that are used to assess schools 
as these students may lower the average test scores of schools. Gaming refers to schools 
manipulating actual behaviour.  
 
Most studies provide examples of intended strategic responses of teachers and head teachers 
to Ofsted inspection in England, explaining how teachers plan artificial lessons to please 
Ofsted during inspection visits, gearing teaching towards what inspectors are going to value 
and measure as outlined in the inspection framework documentation and ‘teach to inspection’ 
(Webb et al, 1998; Kogan and Brunel University, 1999; Hall and Noyes, 2007; Richards, 
2014; Hardy, 2012). Kogan and Brunel University (1999) and Perryman’s (2009) study also 
shows how teachers and managers ‘perform’ during an inspection and put up a show. 
Chapman (2001) and Brimblecombe (2000) explain how the lessons taught during an 
inspection visit are more highly prepared than normal, and how teachers plan and deliver 
‘safer’ and more teacher-led classes to avoid the possibility of loss of control during the 
inspection observation. Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster (1999) found that 81% of 
principals surveyed claimed that inspectors did not see the school as it normally is, where in 
Brimblecombe et al’s (1996) study a third of surveyed teachers suggested the inspector did 
not see a typical lesson. Roberts-Holmes (2014) also explains how teachers in England game 
the system when they adjust profiles of students such that a decent number of them attained 
good levels of development.  
 3 
 
A recent EU-study by Ehren et al (2013; see also Jones et al, in prep) also asked principals in 
England, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and Austria about potential manipulation of 
inspection data, and about putting procedures and protocols in writing in preparation for 
inspection visits. The findings from this study suggest that these intended strategic responses 
are more prevalent across all the five countries than unintended strategic responses. Principals 
in all the five countries, except for the Netherlands agree that school inspections are about 
putting protocols and procedures in writing in preparation for the inspection visit. Principals 
in all the countries, except for Ireland, however disagree with presenting a more positive 
picture of the school to the Inspectorate.  
 
5.2.2 Unintended strategic behaviour 
Unintended strategic behaviour is a second category of unintended consequences. According 
to De Wolf and Janssens (2007) this category refers to the unintended influencing of 
behaviour by the assessor and/or by the method of working used for the assessment. In effect 
this means a (usually unintended) one-sided emphasis on the elements that are assessed, such 
as described in the inspection framework and protocols and guidelines inspectors use during 
school visits. De Wolf and Janssens (2007) describe a number of examples of unintended 
strategic behaviour, such as ‘tunnel vision’ where schools emphasize phenomena that are 
quantified in the performance measurement scheme, at the expense of unquantifiable aspects 
of performance. Schools focus for example on programming a large number of lesson hours 
instead of trying to improve the quality of lessons offered.  
Suboptimization is another example of unintended strategic behaviour. Local objectives are 
pursued by schools, at the expense of the objectives of the school as a whole, such as when 
teachers and principals focus the curriculum and teaching on mathematics and literacy when 
those are inspected, ignoring other subject areas that are important for students’ success in 
later (school) life. Myopia, a third example, includes schools pursuing short term targets (for 
example improving test scores by means of redirecting students to easier subjects) at the 
expense of legitimate long term objectives (improving student achievement in difficult 
subjects). Schools aim at success that can be established very quickly, instead of long-term 
school improvement. Ossification, or organizational paralysis, is a fourth type of unintended 
strategic behaviour which occurs when schools refrain from innovating and ignore changes 
and threats, because innovative arrangements are not rewarded in the inspection framework. 
Schools are expected to suffer from ossification when performance measurement schemes are 
used rigidly. Measure fixation is a last example of unintended strategic behaviour and refers 
to schools that focus on measures of success rather than the underlying objective. Schools 
implement, for example, self-evaluation instruments to score positively on inspection 
indicators used for measuring quality assurance, instead of implementing such instruments to 
improve the quality of their education. 
 
Our systematic literature review provides evidence of unintended strategic behaviour of 
teachers and principals across a number of countries, but particularly England. A recent EU-
study (see Jones et al, in prep) shows how principals in England scored significantly higher 
on items around unintended strategic responses, particularly on items about refocusing and 
narrowing the curriculum and teaching and learning strategies to meet inspection criteria, 
compared to their peers in the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and Austria.  
School inspections also seem to slow down school development when schools suspend school 
activities when time is needed to prepare for inspections or had less energy for change after 
an intense visit (Ouston et al, 1997; Hopkins et al, 1999; Plowright, 2007; Berry, 2012). Nees 
(2006) reports of concerns about the sustainability of improvements made in six primary 
schools in Wellington (New Zealand) in response to external review, including recruitment 
challenges and barriers to learning among their students. Hopkins et al (1999) also explain 
how relationships within schools suffer from the pressure to prepare and undergo an Ofsted 
inspection (Hopkins et al, 1999), and how the normal running of the school is interrupted 
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during an inspection visit when inspectors for example influence the behaviour and 
contributions of pupils in lessons (Dean, 1995; Gray and Gardner, 1999).  
 
An OECD report (2013) refers to a study from West et al (2011) who explain the shift from 
an improvement culture to one of compliance to inspection criteria as a result of the 
publication of league tables, school competition and the risk of sanctions for failure in 
inspections. According to Braun et al (2010), external pressures, such as from Ofsted, 
reinforce stereotypes about students and learning; they describe a specific example of how 
beliefs about female students needing to involve themselves actively in lessons in order to 
learn and achieve were reinforced.  
Day and Gu (2010), Lupton et al (2012) and Chapman (2002) clarify how schools who are 
not improving loose local authority confidence, are under increased scrutiny by both the local 
authority and the inspectorate, loose professional autonomy and motivation and move towards 
a ‘low-risk culture’. The two schools in Lupton et al’s (2012)  case study felt encouraged to 
move to narrower forms of pedagogy and ‘teaching to the test’. The combination of the 
schools’ low Ofsted rating and position in the league tables, their disadvantaged 
circumstances and the consequent ways in which both teacher and pupil identity are 
constructed and institutionalised were seen as the main causes of such unintended strategic 
responses. 
5.2.3 Other unintended consequences 
Our systematic literature review suggests a range of other unintended consequences from 
school inspections. A large number of studies from England describe the intense anxiety, fear, 
high workload to prepare paperwork and provide data, stress and demoralizing of staff 
associated with Ofsted inspections, often leading to time off for illness after inspections, 
particularly in schools who were placed in special measures (Jeffrey and Woods, 1996; Sebba 
et al, 1996; Webb et al, 1998; Gray and Gardner, 1999; Scanlon, 1999; Lee and Davies, 2000; 
Chapman, 2000, 2002; Case, 2000; Follows, 2001; Keeble-Allen, 2004; Hardy, 2012; Berry, 
2012). The special measures label was punitive and stigmatising for schools and the sense of 
being permanently under a disciplinary regime can lead to fear, anger, disaffection and a loss 
of power and control, according to Perryman (2002, 2007). Jeffrey and Woods (1996) explain 
how teachers feel a ‘loss of pedagogic values’ – described as a grieving process, teaching 
being reduced to numbers and percentages that were ‘satisfactory’, and people feeling 
persecuted and guilty through the exercise of bureaucratic controls. According to Jeffrey and 
Woods (1996), inspections led teachers to lose confidence in their professional role and to 
redefine their profession from a moral profession to a more instrumental one, aimed at 
achieving high test scores.  
 
Stress and anxiety is in most schools highest in preparation for the inspection. In Kogan and 
Brunel University’s study (1999), teachers explain how they felt the inspection itself was less 
traumatic than expected. Brimblecombe et al (1995) however describe how teachers also 
experience high levels of stress during an inspection visit when inspectors behave in an 
‘inspectoral’ or punitive manner (focusing on negative issues in the school), and this can, 
according to Berry (2012), Bates (2013) and Courtney and Steven (2013) undermine 
confidence and commitment, increase cynicism and resentment about the inspection process, 
and reduce overall trust within the system. Findings from Courtney and Steven’s qualitative 
study (2013) suggest that outstanding headteachers are less likely to take a job in a deprived 
area due to worse job security and greater difficulty in achieving a high grade and felt that 
there was a ‘climate of fear’ created by Ofsted’s inspection framework. Some of the anxiety 
may be reduced through pre-visit contact between school and inspector, particularly when 
inspectors are reassuring (Dean, 1995). 
 
Increased workload is also mentioned in many studies as an unintended consequence of 
Ofsted school inspections (e.g. Jeffrey and Woods, 1996; Keeble-Allen, 2004; Lee and 
Davies, 2000; Hardy, 2012; Jones et al, 2015). Hall and Noyes (2007) describe how the 
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requirements for self-evaluation increased the workload when preparing for an inspection, 
whereas Kogan and Brunel University (1999) and Scanlon (1999) quote school staff 
reflecting on their preparation for an Ofsted inspection visit as being a very bureaucratic 
exercise. 
 
Lupton et al (2012), Courtney (2012) and Brookes (2008) also explain how inspection 
outcomes have consequences for headteachers’ careers who often lose their job as a result of 
a low Ofsted grade, contributing to poor retention and recruitment of school leaders.  
 
Similar side effects on workload and stress levels have been reported in Hong Kong, 
particularly in schools from ‘weak settings’ who had problems with recruiting and retaining 
suitable staff (MacBeath, 2008; Wong and Li, 2010). MacBeath (2008) and Chapman (2002) 
describe how school leaders in England and Hong Kong have an important role in mediating 
levels of stress and high workload among/of staff by supporting external review as an 
opportunity for improvement, instead as a threat.  
Ehren and Shackleton (2014) additionally found unintended consequences in secondary 
schools in the Netherlands who were judged to be weak or very weak by the Dutch 
Inspectorate. These schools saw a decline in student satisfaction and in student numbers 
following the inspection.  
5.2.4 Unintended consequences of high stakes testing 
A different strand of the literature covers the side effects from high stakes testing and league 
tables, such as teaching to the test. As many school inspection systems include student 
achievement data in their data collection to assess school quality, research and the evidence 
base on high stakes testing and test-based accountability is also relevant in thinking about 
unintended consequences from school inspections.  
Research on high-stakes testing has particularly been carried out in the United States since the 
introduction of test-based accountability in the 1990s culminating in the ‘No Child Left 
Behind’ Act introduced in 2001. The bill requires states to judge the performance of schools 
based on annual test scores. As a result of these changes there have been a number of studies 
from the US focussing on the effects and side effects of high stakes testing. Several authors 
have tried to distinguish teacher practices to prepare students for testing that are ethical, 
legitimate, have beneficial effects on learning and lead to valid increases in test scores from 
less beneficial activities.  
 
Koretz, McCaffrey and Hamilton (2001) for example propose a continuum of teacher 
responses to high stakes testing in which they distinguish responses that are likely to be 
positive, ambiguous or negative in promoting student learning, and in leading to (in)valid test 
scores. As the connection between specific teacher responses to testing and learning gains of 
students has not been studied, this list is hypothetical.  
Positive responses are, according to these authors, those responses that are expected to lead to 
beneficial effects on learning and to valid increases in test scores. Examples of such responses 
are when teachers provide more instructional time, cover more material or teach more 
effectively. Haladyna et al (1991) also consider increasing student motivation to do well on 
the test, checking answer sheets to ensure they were completed properly and teaching test-
taking skills ethical and positive responses.  
 
Koretz, McCaffrey and Hamilton (2001), Stecher (2002) and Booher-Jennings (2005) also 
identify responses of teachers to high stakes tests whose impact is ambiguous; the impact 
depends on the specific circumstances. Examples of ambiguous responses are: 
- reallocating instructional resources (classroom time or students’ study time) within and 
across subjects to emphasize topics covered by the test instead of content that receives 
little or no emphasis on the test  
- coaching students to do better by focusing instruction on incidental aspects of the test 
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- aligning instruction with standards to give material and curriculum content that is 
consistent with standards more emphasis 
- targeting instructional resources to students close to a cut-point set in the accountability 
system to improve the school’s overall score on the accountability measures (educational 
triage) 
 
According to Stecher (2002), reallocation, alignment and coaching may have positive 
consequences when they focus on important aspects of the domain the test is designed to 
measure or specific skills that help students demonstrate their actual achievement. Students 
will be offered more time and resources to learn these domains and skills. Also, familiarizing 
students with the format and other aspects of a test can increase the validity of scores when 
certain mistakes on tests that are made because students don’t understand test instructions or 
question formats, are prevented.  
Reallocation and alignment have positive consequences for tested subjects that are 
emphasized in the curriculum and instruction, but negative consequences for important 
aspects of the curriculum that are not represented in the test and are now being ignored (for 
example because they are difficult to assess in a multiple choice test format, such as listening 
and speaking skills) (Stecher, 2002).  
According to Stecher (2002), coaching can also lead to negative consequences when it 
improves test performance by focusing on features of the test that are incidental to the domain 
the test is supposed to measure. Because these features are incidental, learning about them 
does not produce real improvement in students’ knowledge of the domain. In this case, 
teachers instruct pupils to do well on a test but fail to teach them to transfer this knowledge to 
different types of problems or even different formats of test items.  
 
Negative responses are those that are considered to be unethical and harmful for student 
learning and will lead to invalid increases in test scores. Examples of such responses are, 
according to Stecher (2002), when teachers respond to high-stakes testing by cheating and 
distorting data used to measure the school’s status on the accountability measures or when 
using instruction time to ineffectively drill and practice students for the test. Jacob and Levitt 
(2003) revealed 4-5% of the classrooms in their US-based study cheating each year. Teachers 
may do so by prompting students with the right answer during a test, providing the actual test 
items in advance, providing hints during test administration, making changes to answer sheets 
before scoring or leaving pertinent materials in view during the testing session. These 
responses lead to harmful consequences for student learning or inflated test scores. 
Figlio and Getzler (2002) and Cullen and Reback (2006) also describe how schools at risk of 
failing improve their state-assigned grade or classification by taking their poorest performing 
students out of the testing pool. This type of response is usually referred to as ‘reshaping the 
test pool’. Schools may do so by classifying (regular) students into the ‘special education’ or 
‘limited English proficient’ categories that may be exempted from taking the test (Jacob, 
2005; Cullen and Reback, 2006; Figlio and Getzler, 2006). Other methods used are retaining 
low-scoring students in grades below those in which the test is administered, directing 
students to lower educational tracks, allowing an increase in absences on test days, granting 
exemptions from testing by parents of low achieving students and increasing dropout rates of 
low achieving students.  
The table below provides a summary of these responses.  
 
Table 1. Classification of teachers’ responses to high stakes testing 
 
Positive responses 
- Providing more instructional time 
- Working harder to cover more material and content 
- Working more effectively (achievement orientation, quality of instruction) 
Ambiguous responses 
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- Reallocation of instructional resources (time and material) 
- Coaching 
- Aligning instruction with standards 
- Targeting instruction to students close to accountability target (educational triage) 
Negative responses 
- Using instruction time to drill and practice for the test 
- Reshaping the test pool 
- Cheating 
 
 
There is currently limited evidence on the extent to which these responses to high stakes 
testing also occur in inspection systems that use standardized tests to evaluate schools. 
Available research of Ehren and Swanborn (2012) on schools’ responses to the use of student 
achievement data by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education suggests some reshaping of the test 
pool and questionable test administration practices (e.g. clarifying test questions to prompting 
students with the correct answer) in the Netherlands, but as there were no key differences 
between high and low performing schools it is possible this was due to other motives rather 
than aiming to improve inspection evaluations.  
 
Sturman (2003) studied survey data from primary schools in England and found some 
evidence on teaching to the test and showed that test preparation occupied a large proportion 
of time. However Sturman argues that these practices can have beneficial effects as well as 
negative effects leading to score inflation. Tymms (2004) also suggests that test score rises in 
English primary schools were partly due to teaching to the test practices. Wiggins and Tymms 
(2002) use survey data to compare primary schools in England (where league tables of 
examination results are published) with Scotland (where no results are published). They find 
large differences between Scottish and English schools, with English schools reporting more 
concentration on performance targets at the expense of other important objectives, a greater 
‘narrowing effect’ on the curriculum due to testing and a greater focus on ‘borderline’ 
students (those close to the border for national target levels) at the expense of other students.  
Similar findings have been reported by Kogan and Brunel University (1999), Hall and Noyes 
(2007), Hardy (2012), Lupton and Hempel-Jorgensen  (2012), and Roberts-Holmes (2014) 
who talk about the narrowing of teaching and the curriculum to exams and to focus on 
progress in literacy and numeracy, concerns about exam results constraining pedagogical 
practice and 'substantive student learning in general', and narrowing the understanding of 
successful pupil outcomes to those that are readily measurable by testing.  
 
Roberts-Holmes (2014) describes how teachers try to game the system by adjusting profiles 
of students such that a decent number of them attain a ‘good level of development’ to prevent 
intensive scrutiny by Ofsted. Additionally, Hardy (2012) discusses a tendency for teachers to 
focus on students near pass/fail borderlines and to focus on practices to improve results rather 
than student learning overall. A large quantitative study by Hussain (2012) however does not 
corroborate these results as his examination of schools’ improvement in relation to prior 
attainment showed improvement for all the students in the schools, suggesting that schools do 
not target borderline students or fail to enter students less likely to perform well. 
 
Ehren and Jones, in a comparative EU-study on the impact of school inspections (see Ehren et 
al, 2013) surveyed teachers from different grades in primary and secondary education in the 
Netherlands and England about their responses to standardized tests used by the Inspectorate 
of Education in both countries. As table .. shows, teachers in both countries report little 
activities to prepare students for the test; they disagree on all the statements asking them 
about coaching students and using drill and practice to prepare students for standardized tests, 
or reallocating their curriculum and instruction to tested subjects. There are however some 
significant differences between teachers in England and the Netherlands with teachers in 
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England generally reporting higher scores for coaching students to do well on the test and 
using drill and practice to prepare them for the test. Teachers in the Netherlands however 
report more activities to align their curriculum and instruction to the test, particularly in 
reviewing the test to decide on which topics to teach.  
 
Table .. Teachers’ responses to high stakes testing (combined teacher data, Y1, 2, 3) 
 
 N Mean SD Mean difference 
(for significant 
differences 
between country 
means) 
Teaching to the test 
(14 items, α = 0.84) 
England 768 2.48 .57  
Netherlands 696 2.43 .75  
 
Reallocation 
(2 items, α = 0.64) 
England 655 2.18 .90 -0.39** 
Netherlands 680 2.57 1.10 
I reviewed what was on last year’s test 
when designing my lesson plan/pacing 
calendar for this year 
England 655 2.16 .950 -.410** 
  Netherlands 680 2.57 1.095 
I adjust my instructional plans based on the 
test/exam performance of the class I had last 
year 
England 185 2.43 .936   
Netherlands 0a       
I teach topics that are not on the test/exam 
after 
England 646 2.29 .982 .140* 
  Netherlands 687 2.15 1.308 
 
Coaching 
(5 items, α = 0.82) 
England 663 2.73 .71 0.18** 
Netherlands 696 2.55 0.94 
Teaching test-taking skills, such as 
pacing/timing, strategies for answering 
multiple-choice questions, eliminating 
wrong m.c. options, filling in answer sheets 
England 656 2.71 1.046 -.146* 
  Netherlands 626 2.86 1.212 
Explaining questions from the test that was 
administered last year 
England 652 2.57 .963 .454** 
  Netherlands 599 2.12 1.106 
Discussing responses to the test items England 654 2.83 .947 .827** 
  Netherlands 608 2.00 1.080 
I emphasize particular styles and formats of 
problems in the test/exam in instruction 
(e.g. using particular styles of graphs; using 
specific key phrases) 
England 654 2.85 0.91 .201** 
 Netherlands 687 2.65 1.06 
Within 1 month of testing, I provide a 
“refresher” on content and/or skill areas that 
specifically match those on the test/exam. 
England 651 2.73 .986   
Netherlands 693 2.74 1.261   
 
Drill and practice 
(4 items, α = 0.70) 
England 660 2.36 0.69 0.15** 
Netherlands 694 2.21 .96 
Having students practice old tests England 452 2.56 .828 .591** 
  Netherlands 587 1.97 1.068 
Providing practice on questions from the 
test that was administered last year 
England 652 2.60 .981   
Netherlands 609 1.61 .915   
I use m.c. questions from previous tests in England 647 1.92 .990 -.383** 
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my classroom assessments. Netherlands 687 2.31 1.403   
Within 1 month of testing, I use practice 
exercises/tests with multiple-choice 
questions and language similar to that found 
on the test/exam. 
England 651 2.49 1.069 -.153* 
Note: technical report for description of sample, data collection and analyses can be found on 
www.schoolinspections.eu 
 
5.3. An example from England 
As many studies of unintended consequences from school inspections are from England, this 
section presents a case study from Perryman (2006) as an example of some of the responses 
described before. This particular case study was conducted under the auspices of the 2003 
Ofsted school inspection framework, when schools had long notice periods to prepare for 
inspections. 
 
In Perryman’s (2006) research in Northgate, the case study school was in special measures. 
At Northgate, working under special measures, teachers found that the best way to get out of 
this category was to act as if they were being inspected all the time, in order to train 
themselves and pupils into expected modes of behaviour, and so that the arrival of an 
inspector would be easier to deal with, and part of the routine. Ball’s phrase ‘an organisation 
for ‘the gaze’ and for the avoidance of ‘the gaze’’ (1997, p.332) seems very appropriate for 
Northgate, which, during special measures and before and during its Ofsted inspection, 
seemed like an organisation existing purely for the purposes of passing an inspection.  
 
Documentation was used to both inculcate and demonstrate a discourse of effectiveness. Ball 
(2003, p.8) remarks that under inspection ‘what is produced is a spectacle or what we might 
see as an ‘enacted fantasy’ which is there to be seen and judged’. He goes on to say that ‘the 
heart of the educational project is gouged out and left empty. Authenticity is replaced by 
plasticity’. Under an inspection regime, a school’s documentation becomes part of the 
surveillance. This is not unusual, as Duffy (1999, p.110) notes: 
 
Some of the documents generated by a school for an inspection may have the aim of 
giving the best possible impression to the inspectors, and the school might not be so 
prolific in its production of policy statements or so up to date in its handbook if the 
inspection was not imminent. 
 
In schools this can be seen in constant clarifications of policies and procedures, in 
departmental handbooks, school and departmental action plans. Northgate was reinspected 
within two years of coming out of special measures, as is necessary in such circumstances. 
The school had learned its lessons well. As was usual under the 2003 Inspection Framework, 
the school had eight weeks’ notice. Documentation was prepared, schemes of work and 
lesson-plans revamped and the full performative environment recreated. Extensive 
documentation was produced at department level. 
 
In addition to department documentation, for the inspection the school had to produce a self-
evaluation document called the S4, which under the 2003 Ofsted model, was very important. 
Ofsted would use the S4 to plan their visit, as the school would identify strengths and 
weaknesses. This was not a straightforward process, and would be the first time the game 
metaphor was made explicit: 
A visiting governor, with Ofsted experience, made it very clear to the senior team that 
they had to play a clever game. Strengths had to be identified, but not overplayed; 
weaknesses discussed, but in the light of planned improvements. If Ofsted agreed with 
the self-evaluation, it was implied, then all would be well. 
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In the 2005 framework the S4 was replaced by the even more stringent SEF (self-evaluation 
form) which served as the main document that Ofsted used to prepare its inspection of the 
school. The problem with self-evaluation documents produced for evaluation is that for some 
schools an honest warts-and-all approach is simply not possible. As far as some schools are 
concerned, over-emphasise strengths and they could be criticised for complacency with a 
management team unable to plan for progress, but identify too many weaknesses and there is 
a risk of giving a skewed picture which may influence the judgement of the inspectors 
negatively. Mel describes similar dilemmas with her subject documentation:  
I'm worried that if I put that in the Department Review and say 'I'm going to do this, 
I'm going to do that' there will be too much 'I'm going to' rather than I'm there doing 
it (Mel, middle manager). 
 
Was Mel to admit she hadn’t started many of her well-intentioned plans, or pretend 
everything was in hand? This approach does have implications for an institution’s 
improvement, because if it disguises serious faults in order to avoid going into special 
measures, then it will not receive the support it may need.  
 
Fabricating the stage 
Another finding from Perryman’s case study was the great deal of preparation done for the 
inspection. For example, before the Ofsted inspection, the school had a special in-service 
training day, specifically set aside for departments to work together on their lesson plans for 
Ofsted. Displays were created and erected. The Registered Inspector had requested work to be 
collated for six pupils per year into subject boxes; two from pupils of higher ability, two 
medium and two lower. There was frantic activity after school as departments selected their 
book samples. They were playing the game of selecting two ‘low achievers’’ books that 
‘aren’t too low’. As someone remarked, ‘If someone is ‘low’, won’t their book be really 
crap?’ (field notes). 
 
In the week before the inspection, Lola, a head of department, wearily listed the extra work 
she’d had to do, and expressed the desire to just get it over with: 
We've had to be observed and jump through the hoops for the observations. We've 
had to put a lot of unnecessary paperwork and things in place that were in place, but 
it's now decided that it's got to be done in a certain format, because everybody's got 
to use the same format. (Lola, middle manager) 
 
Everyone had to use exactly the same lesson plan format, schemes of work were written to a 
rigorous formula. There was no room for deviation.  
 
Playing the game 
At Northgate, preparing the stage went far beyond just the physical environment. There was a 
real sense from middle and senior managers that they were playing a game. This not only 
involved jumping through the prescribed hoops, teaching lessons in the correct manner, 
presenting all the correct documentation etc, but also suppressing negative thoughts and 
comments – and even hiding some pupils. Apart from lesson observations, the inspectors 
would be speaking to around 70 pupils and stressed that it was important to have quality time 
with them. The meeting schedule for teachers was organised. Meetings were rehearsed and 
these findings are echoed by Grace (Jeffrey and Woods, 1998, p.155) ‘We practised ensuring 
that we presented a consensus for any interviews we had. It was very helpful. I want them to 
say that the Senior Management Team has a shared clear view’. 
 
It was in the stage-managing of the morning briefing that the performance seemed really 
blatant. Morning briefings occurred at Northgate before the beginning of every school day, as 
the whole staff met to hear and give announcements (such as timetable changes, staff 
absences etc). The inspectors would expect to attend briefings, and Perryman’s field notes 
remark on the way in which there was a rehearsal of how the first morning meeting in the 
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presence of the inspectors would go, and its subsequent success. During the inspection week, 
she wrote: 
The staff briefing goes as rehearsed. The room is very crowded, with the addition of 
13 inspectors. Lots of ‘showy’ things said, most of which were already announced on 
Thursday – football scores, a cricket award and a Year 9 trip to the Globe Theatre. 
One head of department said ‘it's all so bloody false. I'd like to know what people are 
doing this week that they’re not normally doing’.  
 
Resistance and cynicism 
Teachers cannot refuse to be inspected, but can resist it in how they perform and stage 
manage what is seen, and in their grudging response to inspectors’ judgements, with ‘failing’ 
viewed as a political construct, and ‘success’ greeted with cynical snorts. 
 
In one example of resistance, some of the performance went as far as actually fooling the 
inspectors. As Helen reflected a year later: 
I think the problem is that it is too easy to fool Ofsted. I think it is very easy to present 
them with superficialities in terms of paperwork that they are impressed by, and then 
when they go away you know that this is just a facade and therefore you have no 
respect for the whole process and that is how I feel about it (Helen, middle manager). 
 
Similarly, a school middle manager told Stoll and Fink (1996, p.5), ‘I thought there were a lot 
of issues, both good and bad, that the Ofsted report hadn’t even touched on here… it didn’t 
focus very deeply on issues which affected the school’. This is an important issue as, if 
schools are hiding their weaknesses (and thus their real development needs) from inspectors, 
then real progress and improvement will be severely hampered. Plowright (2007, p.384) also 
found that the school he researched covered up its real problems, one head of department 
complaining ‘each time…they paper over the cracks and it looks fantastic on the report. 
Whereas you only have to go a little bit deeper and there are real problems’. 
 
Continuing the theme of fooling the inspectors, was the issue of the rather sinister sounding 
‘redirected pupils’. At Northgate around 20 of the most troublesome students were being sent 
off on various activities during Ofsted week, some on a residential trip to an outdoor activity 
centre, others on a programme of educational day trips with their learning mentors, some of 
which would lead to Duke of Edinburgh Awards. This is not an unusual strategy adopted by 
schools during inspection. A correspondent on the Times Educational Supplement forum 
comments: 
The pupils were well behaved which the inspector commented on. This is perhaps not 
surprising, as due to a reciprocal agreement with heads of other local schools, many 
of the most challenging pupils were on ‘step out’ visits for the duration. A large 
number of others ended up on temporary exclusions. ('halfmeltedsnowman' in Duffy, 
M. 2005) 
 
MacBeath (2004) concurs, noting of one English secondary school under inspection that 
‘troubled students were sent away to an outdoor pursuits centre to partake in a week long 
alternative education system’.  
Replacing teachers or ensuring the less capable were not present during the week of the 
inspection has also been reported. An interesting example was given by an AST (advanced 
skills teacher) on the TES forum. The posting is reproduced below.  
I currently work as an Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) in the London area. Having started my 
secondment to a struggling school in North London; I had been there for one day a week for four 
weeks; I was apprehended at the end of my Year 11 parents evening by my Principal. He asked 
me if I could go into my secondment school the following morning and teach their Science 
NQTs timetable as the school was being Ofsteded and the SLT had asked her to stay at home. 
Firstly, I must state I am a Chemist not a Physicist and this lady taught primarily Physics; 
secondly it was 8.30 at night; thirdly the school expected me to plan all the lessons outright. I 
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foolishly agreed to go in to support but was not happy about the situation and had been assured 
nobody would visit my classroom. On arrival I was met by the school's lead deputy who handed 
me a wedge of data and escorted me to the conference room and introduced me to the Ofsted 
team as the Acting Head of Science... I am not sorry to say I revealed everything to the 
Inspectors and was promptly sent home and threatened with dismissal from the secondment 
school's SLT. I never did return. The school went into special measures and I left my school 
after a big disagreement with the Head over acceptable and reasonable behaviour... What is the 
most unprofessional situation you have been placed in? 
 
The question she raises is an interesting one. This example is also included in a TES article 
‘Tricks of the trade’ (Stewart, 2012) which discusses the underhand tactics increasingly being 
used by schools to trick inspectors, according to teachers. The range of methods, as well as 
‘borrowing’ outstanding staff from neighbouring schools to take lessons, includes telling their 
own weak teachers to go off sick, borrowing brilliant artwork from other schools to impress 
inspectors and even paying students to absent themselves. Despite having good attendance 
records, poorly behaved students were being paid to truant to prevent their schools getting 
bad ratings. This TES article (www.tes.org.com) promoted an official response from Ofsted 
(see Box below) and very soon after it was announced, coincidentally perhaps, that there were 
plans to introduce no-notice inspections for all regular school and college inspections from 
September 2012. Speaking about the plans, Sir Michael Wilshaw HMCI, said: 
Ofsted has been moving towards a position of unannounced school inspection over a 
period of years. I believe the time is now right for us to take that final step and make 
sure that for every school we visit inspectors are seeing schools as they really are in 
the corridors, classrooms and staff room. (Ofsted Press release – 10 January 2012) 
 
Figure 7.1 Ofsted responds to reports about inspection (06 Jan 2012) 
Ofsted National Director, Sue Gregory, has responded to news reports alleging that some 
schools are attempting to manipulate Ofsted inspections. 
She said: 'In over 5,500 school inspections conducted by professional and highly trained 
inspectors last year there have been only a handful of issues raised with us about possible 
misrepresentation of the school’s position, all of which were looked into. Schools have no 
more than two days notice of inspection and, with a thorough examination of the schools 
record, including attendance levels and staffing details, any sudden changes are readily 
observed. While we do not take suggestions of wrong doing lightly, it would be a disservice 
to all those schools who strive to do the best for their pupils to suggest that there is some sort 
of wide-scale problem based on anonymous and unsubstantiated claims’. 
  
5.4. Explaining unintended consequences 
The previous section indicated interesting differences in unintended consequences between 
countries and provided an example from England. These findings lead us to question the 
causes of unintended consequences and the specific elements of school inspection systems 
that motivate such strategic behaviours. A paper by Altrichter and Kemethofer (2015) and 
Jones et al (in prep) sheds some light on this question in explaining how “accountability 
pressure” on schools is associated with unintended negative effects. Altrichter and 
Kemethofer (2015, p.10) define such pressure as ‘pressure on individual schools and their 
representatives to act in conformity with the standards of an accountability system and to take 
action to improve school quality and effectiveness’. Pressure is expected to motivate school 
staff to anticipate how they are being evaluated and how targets are set, and to modify their 
behaviour accordingly. Unintended consequences arise when performance targets and 
measures are imperfect representations of the actual efforts and performance they purport to 
measure, which is likely to be the case when measuring something as complex as educational 
quality (Smith, 1995).  
Altrichter and Kemethofer (2015) and Jones et al (in prep) compared the high pressure 
inspection systems in England and the Netherlands to the low(er) stakes systems in Austria, 
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Sweden, Ireland and the Czech Republic. High stakes systems are, according to these authors, 
systems that target failing schools for intensive monitoring, have thresholds in place to 
distinguish failing schools, sanction for low-performing schools, and report inspection 
assessments of individual schools to the general public to systems that are considered to be 
low stakes. Reporting school inspection reports may enhance accountability pressure as a 
school’s stakeholders will notice and make use of inspection results, according to Maritzen 
(2007). Altrichter and Kemethofer (2015) found that principals in high stakes inspection 
systems experience more “accountability pressure” and also report of significantly more 
unintended consequences. School leaders in the Austrian “low-pressure accountability” 
system say less often that they take measures to discourage new teaching strategies and to 
narrow the curriculum than those in the English system, which are characterized by more 
accountability pressure. Schools with lower Ofsted grades, who are under pressure to 
improve, particularly report of narrowing the curriculum and instructional strategies in 
schools. These schools are under most pressure to improve quickly and apparently revert to 
quick fix solutions to do so. There is however limited evidence on whether these side effects 
disappear when school move to more positive inspection categories. 
 
Pressure is, according to Jones et al (in prep), however not the only explanation for 
unintended consequences. Ehren et al (tr) for example describe how mechanisms that cause 
school improvement from inspections equally result in side effects. The fact that inspection 
systems set expectations for principals and teachers on good education seems to lead on the 
one hand to positive outcomes where schools improve the quality of teaching and the 
organisation of the school, but oftentimes also lead to unintended consequences when 
principals and teachers choose strategies that are dysfunctional in the long run, such as when 
they overly narrow their curriculum and instruction to meet inspection criteria.  
The example presented from England allows us to understand and reflect on how this 
mechanism operates. The case study shows how school inspections cause schools to 
internalise expected behaviours, and learn these behaviours through acceptance of a 
discourse. Schools learn how to perform within the accepted norms of an ‘effective school’, a 
concept inspired by the discourse of school effectiveness research. Phrases such as ‘experts 
say…’, ‘studies show…’, and ‘research has concluded…’ give power to the concepts 
underlying inspection standards and frameworks; these concepts are incorporated in the 
environment in which schools and teachers operate (e.g. through curriculum frameworks, 
assessment, self-evaluations) and create an environment in which there is little room for 
schools to deviate from these concepts. As Ball (1990, p.162) explains ‘teachers are trapped 
into taking responsibility for their own disciplining through schemes of self-appraisal, school 
improvement and institutional development’.  
 
A relevant question to ask is when these processes of normalisation and setting expectations 
lead to genuine improvement and when they lead to unintended consequences of reinforcing 
strict and potentially ineffective recipes for how a school should be run. Jeffrey and Woods 
(1998, p.106) argue that the school effectiveness discourse as enforced by Ofsted inspectors 
has led to a colonisation of schools where over-mechanistic approaches of replicating 
effectiveness factors from research become the dominant model over time. Thus schools 
having learnt the accepted modes of behaviour in preparing for inspection visits, they 
continue to perform the good school between inspections until that becomes how the school 
functions all the time.  
 
Such behaviour is reinforced through the implementation of internal quality assurance and 
monitoring which creates a situation of continuous surveillance where those concerned come 
to discipline themselves (Harland, 1996, p.101). Wilcox and Gray (1996, p.120) also link 
inspection with disciplinary mechanisms, 'as it requires a school to undergo an exacting 
discipline which extends over a period considerably longer than that of the inspection week 
and may also lead to a school being disciplined'. Inspection handbooks continue to influence 
schools in between inspections and are often used as a management development tool. As 
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Troman (1997, p.349) describes, ‘inspectors are the absent presence in the school’. This 
practice is actively promoted by Ofsted as former HMCI Chris Woodhead once remarked that 
headteachers should be seen – and see themselves - as ‘resident inspectors’ (see also 
MacBeath, 2006).  
Unintended consequences arise when accepted models of behaviour include scripted 
blueprints and taxonomies for what an effective school looks like, categorizing schools and 
teachers that have not implemented such blueprints and taxonomies as ineffective or failing, 
when in fact the research provides a much more fuzzy, nuanced and contextualized picture of 
conditions of school effectiveness as we explained in chapter 2.  
 
This raises another explanation for the prevalence of unintended consequences, which relate 
to difficulties in how performance of schools is measured. As Smith (1995) explains 
performance measurement schemes, such as inspection frameworks, often lack precision or 
fidelity in measuring complex phenomena, such as education quality. These schemes 
oftentimes emphasize quantifiable aspects of performance, offering a snapshot of the school’s 
activities and ignoring other unquantifiable, but equally important objectives and activities 
that may have an impact in the long term. Controllers, such as school inspectors, are often 
unable to process performance data correctly, such as when they have to interpret vast 
amounts of test results and apply complicated formulas to correct for school intake and socio-
economic backgrounds of students. Such limitations in adequately measuring school 
performance will cause unintended strategic responses, according to Smith (1995) as schools 
will focus on the quantifiable aspects of their performance as measured by school inspectors 
(e.g. student performance on tested subjects), and ignore aspects of their service delivery that 
are beyond the scope of the inspection framework. 
 
Performance measure schemes are also often inflexible and not equipped to respond to new 
circumstances or adapt to specific contexts in which schools operate. As a result, they may 
not capture specific circumstances in which schools function well, and not match well to 
school internal objectives and values, creating an overall lack of buy-in for inspections and 
specific inspection standards and an incentive to game and manipulate the inspection. School 
staff are likely to feel an incentive to manipulate inspection data when they feel inspections 
are ‘done to’ them, instead of something they actively engage in. Such inflexibility may also 
cause organizational paralysis when inspectors rigidly apply the inspection framework when 
evaluating school performance. Equally, school inspectors may neutralize some of these 
unintended consequences when visiting a school, such as when they contextualize their 
assessment, and discuss school documentation and data with school staff to understand the 
actual achievements of the school and establish the accuracy of the presented facts and 
figures.  
 
The inspection feedback and tone of voice school inspectors use during their visit seems 
another important condition of unintended consequences. As Bates (2013) suggests, 
inspection feedback which focuses on negative issues and error detection may undermine 
confidence of school staff, decrease commitment for improvement and increase cynicism and 
resentment about the inspection process. The tone of voice of inspectors and whether 
inspectors take on an ‘inspectoral role’ instead of a more advisory approach during visits is an 
important reason for reducing trust in external inspections, and causes frustration and stress of 
school staff according to Berry (2012), and Brimblecombe et al (1995). De Waal (2006) 
describes how Ofsted inspectors intimidate schools into compliance, degrade teachers and 
foster fabrication of evidence to meet tick boxes, enforcing a top down dictat about how 
teachers should teach. As a result, teachers and head teachers in this study felt that Ofsted 
inspections were demoralizing and destructive and led to a climate of fear.  
 
Credibility and training of school inspectors are important in creating more positive 
conditions and in ensuring a positive inspection experience for schools, particularly when 
school inspectors are trained to engage with schools in reflecting on improvement and 
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creating a safe environment in which schools are willing to share weaknesses (see 
Memduhoglu, 2012, Penninckx, 2015). Smith (1995) emphasizes that any type of control 
needs to be exercised with great care and discretion as measuring performance is a complex, 
dynamic and ill-defined process. Many organizational outputs, such as school quality and 
outcomes are the result of a joined and collaborative process which unfolds over a long period 
of time, highlighting the need for highly skilled inspectors to evaluate such quality and 
outcomes. A high trust environment, where school staff are open about their performance and 
reflect on improvements is an important condition for effective inspections, particularly as all 
performance indicators will have side effects when school staff are under pressure to perform 
well and eventually learn how to game and manipulate inspection indicators.  
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